Surviving the Narrative Self: Cognitive Disability in Contemporary Fiction
By examining neuroscientific research in relation to contemporary fiction, this dissertation explores new definitions of narrative selfhood that account for people with cognitive disabilities. In fields from philosophy to psychology to cognitive science, selfhood is frequently understood as a narrative concept. Scholars argue that narrative unifies the subject, situating the self temporally in a coherent story that makes sense of experience and provides a basis for agency and autonomy. But where does this leave those who cannot narrate themselves? Cognitive disabilities such as Alzheimer’s disease or autism often impair an individual’s ability to construct and communicate a meaningful life narrative in the usual form. As a result, caregivers, legal authorities, and medical professionals frequently describe an absence of self in these individuals, leading to discriminatory treatment and demeaning stereotypes that diminish their dignity and deprive them of social justice. In this project I examine narrators with cognitive disabilities who use compensatory techniques and alternative forms of narrative to enact components of selfhood such as continuity and agency. Reading these characters in light of recent brain studies, I argue that we must develop more ethical theories of selfhood which account for multiple forms of narrative identity and broader definitions of self.
By examining neuroscientific research in relation to contemporary fiction, this dissertation explores new definitions of narrative selfhood that account for people with cognitive disabilities. In fields from philosophy to psychology to cognitive science, selfhood is frequently understood as a narrative concept. Scholars argue that narrative unifies the subject, situating the self temporally in a coherent story that makes sense of experience and provides a basis for agency and autonomy. But where does this leave those who cannot narrate themselves? Cognitive disabilities such as Alzheimer’s disease or autism often impair an individual’s ability to construct and communicate a meaningful life narrative in the usual form. As a result, caregivers, legal authorities, and medical professionals frequently describe an absence of self in these individuals, leading to discriminatory treatment and demeaning stereotypes that diminish their dignity and deprive them of social justice. In this project I examine narrators with cognitive disabilities who use compensatory techniques and alternative forms of narrative to enact components of selfhood such as continuity and agency. Reading these characters in light of recent brain studies, I argue that we must develop more ethical theories of selfhood which account for multiple forms of narrative identity and broader definitions of self.